Abstract This paper studies Aumann's agreeing to disagree theorem from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic. This was first done by Dégremont and Roy (J Phil Log 41:735-764, 2012) in the qualitative framework of plausibility models. The current paper uses a probabilistic framework, and thus stays closer to Aumann's original formulation. The paper first introduces enriched probabilistic Kripke frames and models, and various ways of updating them. This framework is then used to prove several agreement theorems, which are natural formalizations of Aumann's original result. Furthermore, a sound and complete axiomatization of a dynamic agreement logic is provided, in which one of these agreement theorems can be derived syntactically. These technical results are used to show the importance of explicitly representing the dynamics behind the agreement theorem, and lead to a clarification of some conceptual issues surrounding the agreement theorem, in particular concerning the role of common knowledge. The formalization of the agreement theorem thus constitutes a concrete example of the so-called dynamic turn in logic.
no-trade theorem (Milgrom and Stokey 1982) are of central importance in game theory. Several notions connected to this theorem, such as the common prior assumption, and, especially, the notion of common knowledge, have been studied extensively by game theorists, but also by philosophers, computer scientists and logicians (Halpern and Moses 1990; Lewis 1969; Milgrom and Stokey 1982) . This paper thus establishes a new connection between the epistemic-logical and game-theoretical perspectives on (common) knowledge and related epistemic notions.
This endeavor also has definite advantages for both epistemic logic and game theory as separate disciplines. Probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic is a recent development, and to capture the agreement theorems in this framework, several technical extensions and improvements were necessary. For example, I introduce a new way of defining updated probability functions, which elegantly avoids several of the problems mentioned by Kooi (2003) , and is thus also of independent interest. On a more conceptual level, it will be shown how the technical results established in this paper can be seen as an application of the so-called dynamic turn in logic (van Benthem 1996 (van Benthem , 2011 . The logical perspective on the agreement theorem has definite advantages for game theorists as well, because it offers a new perspective on some methodological issues. In particular, it will be argued that the role of common knowledge is less central to the agreement theorem than is often thought.
Aumann's agreement theorem (and some of its extensions) were first studied from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic by Dégremont and Roy (2012) . They, however, did not use probabilistic Kripke models, but rather epistemic plausibility models. This shift from a probabilistic to a more qualitative setting has profound consequences for the formulation of the agreement theorem. For example, Dégremont and Roy (2012) 's agreement theorems depend crucially on the assumption that the agents' plausibility orderings are well-founded-an order-theoretic notion that played no role in Aumann's original formulation of the agreement theorem, and that will play no role in this paper either. 1 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to Aumann's original agreement theorem and highlights those features that will become particularly important in later sections. Section 3 introduces the semantic setup of probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. I define (enriched) probabilistic Kripke frames and models, and introduce three ways of updating them: (i) carrying out experiments, (ii) public announcement of a formula ϕ, and (iii) a dialogue about a formula ϕ, i.e. a sequence of public annoucements that reaches a fixed point after finitely many steps. Section 4 contains the key results of this paper, viz. several (dynamic) agreement theorems for probabilistic Kripke models/frames. Section 5 provides characterization results for all conditions of the agreement theorems, and then uses these to obtain a sound and complete dynamic agreement logic. Section 6 uses the formal results to show how the dynamic turn in logic can be applied to agreement theorems: I will argue that explicitly representing the dynamics that is behind Aumann's original result leads to important conceptual clarifications, for example, concerning the role and importance of common knowledge in agreement theorems. Finally, Sect. 7 wraps things up and mentions some topics for further research.
Aumann's original agreement theorem
Aumann originally expressed his celebrated 'agreeing to disagree' theorem as follows: "If two people have the same prior, and their posteriors for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal." (Aumann 1976 (Aumann , p. 1236 . In other words: if two people have the same prior, then they cannot agree (have common knowledge of their posteriors) to disagree (while these posteriors are not equal). It is clear that, when phrased in this way, the agreement theorem is a static result: it is a conditional statement that can be expressed without any dynamic operators:
[equalpriors ∧ C(posteriors)] → equalposteriors.
(1)
Aumann also motivates his theorem by sketching an informal scenario that embodies the intuitions behind it. 2 Roughly speaking, the scenario looks as follows. We are considering two agents, 1 and 2. Initially, they have the same probability distribution (P 1 = P 2 ). Then both agents separate, and each agent performs a (different) experiment. Immediately afterwards, the agents' probability distributions have changed due to the information that they have gained from their experiments. Because the agents performed different experiments, their probability distributions have changed in different ways, and are thus no longer identical. In particular, for some ϕ it holds that P 1 (ϕ) = a and P 2 (ϕ) = b (for some a, b ∈ [0, 1]), while a = b. Furthermore, since agent 1 doesn't know the outcome of agent 2's experiment, she doesn't know how agent 2's probability function has changed. A symmetric argument applies to agent 2. Hence, at this stage it is not common knowledge between both agents that P 1 (ϕ) = a and P 2 (ϕ) = b. Finally, the agents start communicating with each other. Agent 1 tells agent 2 that P 1 (ϕ) = a; on the basis of this new information, agent 2 changes her probability function, which she, in turn, communicates to agent 1, etc. At a certain point in the conversation, the agents obtain common knowledge of their probabilities. Since both agents had the same prior (P 1 = P 2 initially) and their posteriors have become common knowledge, Aumann's theorem now says that these probabilities have to coincide (P 1 (ϕ) = P 2 (ϕ) in the end).
Although the formal agreement theorem is a static result, the intuitive scenario behind it clearly involves several dynamic phenomena. Two broad types of dynamics can be distinguished: (i) the experiments and (ii) the communication. This situation seems to be a good illustration of one of the key points in the recent dynamic turn in logic, which van Benthem has formulated as follows: 3 the motivation for standard logics often contains procedural elements present in textbook presentations-and one can make this implicit dynamics explicit (van Benthem, 1996, p. 17) .
Of course, this issue defines an entire research agenda: finding extensions (or better: refinements) of Aumann's original result, in which the dynamics of the scenario described above is explicitly taken into account. Game theorists such as Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) , Bacharach (1985) and Parikh and Krasucki (1990) have done exactly this, focusing on the communication dynamics. Similarly, Dégremont and Roy (2012) have formalized a qualitative version of the agreement theorem in dynamic epistemic logic, again focusing on the communication dynamics.
In this paper, however, I will formalize Aumann's original agreement theorem in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, explicitly representing both types of dynamics (experimentation and communication). Furthermore, I will argue that explicitly representing this dynamics has clear conceptual advantages. 4
The general setup of PDEL
This section introduces the general semantic setup of probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 5 This setup will be used in Sect. 4 to formalize and prove various dynamic agreement theorems.
Probabilistic Kripke models
I first introduce (enriched) probabilistic Kripke frames and models. The focus will be on the two agent-case (this will suffice for the statement of the agreement theorems); generalizations to any (finite) number of agents are straightforward. We also fix a countably infinite set Prop of proposition letters.
Definition 1 An (enriched) probabilistic Kripke frame (for two agents) is a tuple
where W is a non-empty finite set of states, R 1 , R 2 , E 1 and E 2 are equivalence relations, and μ 1 and μ 2 assign to each world w ∈ W a probability mass function The probabilistic Kripke models (and frames) defined above are called 'enriched' to distinguish them from the ones used by Fagin and Halpern (1994) and Kooi (2003) : the current models contain the equivalence relations E i (whose function will be clarified below), whereas Fagin and Halpern's and Kooi's don't. However, the models used in the remainder of this paper are always the enriched ones defined above; therefore I will henceforth omit the extra qualifier and simply talk about 'probabilistic Kripke models'.
I will now comment on the different components of these models. As usual, R i is agent i's epistemic accessibility relation: (w, v) ∈ R i means that i cannot epistemically distinguish between states w and v. The E i -relation represents the structure of agent i's experiment: (w, v) ∈ E i means that agent i's experiment does not differentiate between w and v. The relation R i thus captures agent i's information before any dynamics has taken place, while E i captures the information that she will obtain by carrying out her experiment. 6 Intuitively, we can think of carrying out an experiment as asking a question to nature. This informal analogy carries over to the formal level: the experiment relations E i play the same role in our framework as the issue relations in dynamic epistemic logics of questions (van Benthem and Minicȃ 2012) . The probability mass function μ i (w) represents agent i's subjective probabilities (at state w) before any dynamics has taken place. For example, μ i (w)(v) = a means that at state w, agent i assigns subjective probability a to state v being the actual state. The definition of μ i (w) is lifted to any set X ⊆ W by putting μ i (w)(X ) := x∈X μ i (w) (x) . Conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 1 have intuitive as well as technical justifications. (Frame correspondence results for both conditions will be provided at the end of this subsection, after the object language and its semantics have been formally introduced.) Condition (i) is a 'liveness' condition, requiring that the agents do not assign probability 0 to the actual world. This condition follows from a certain principle of 'prudence'. Consider a world w. If a prudent agent i cannot exclude that world v might be the actual world-i.e., if (w, v) ∈ R i -then she should (at w) assign nonzero probability to it: μ i (w)(v) > 0 (after all, it would be very 'bold' for agent i to assign probability 0 to a possibility that, to the best of her knowledge, might be the actual world!). Since the epistemic indistinguishability relation R i is reflexive, it follows that agent i should assign non-zero probability to w itself: μ i (w)(w) > 0, which is exactly condition (i). 7 The main reasons for including condition (i) are, however, 6 In game-theoretical contexts, R i is usually implicitly taken to be the universal relation W × W (and is therefore often not explicitly mentioned at all), while the equivalence relation E i is identified with the partition i that it generates. Furthermore, if R i = W × W , then condition (ii) of Definition 1 is vacuously satisfied, so that the prior μ i (w) is defined over the entire domain W. 7 At the end of this subsection, we will see that condition (i) corresponds to the formula p → P i ( p) > 0. Furthermore, the prudence principle from which condition (i) follows (for all w,v: if (w, v) Note (trivially, perhaps) that the of a more technical nature. In the next subsections I will introduce several ways of updating probabilistic Kripke models, all of which change the agents' probabilities via Bayesian conditionalization. This requires, however, that μ i (w)(X ) > 0 for several sets X ⊆ W . Condition (i) is an easy way to ensure that μ i (w)(X ) > 0 for all the relevant sets X.
Condition (ii) says that the agents have to assign probability 0 to all states that they can epistemically distinguish from the actual state (i.e. that they know not to be the actual state). This seems to be a very reasonable demand for rational agents. Technically speaking, condition (ii) leads to the following easy, but very useful lemma. 8 
Proof Consider the following calculation:
(The * -labeled step is justified by condition (ii) of Definition 1.)
The (static) language L is defined by means of the following Backus-Naur form:
(where i ∈ {1, 2}, 1 ≤ n < ω and a 1 , . . . , a n , k ∈ Q). (We only allow rational numbers as values for a 1 , . . . , a n , k in order to keep the language countable.) As usual, K i ϕ means that agent i knows that ϕ. Furthermore, we have the relativized common knowledge operator C ϕ ψ, which intuitively says that if ϕ is announced, then it becomes common knowledge (among agents 1 and 2) that ψ was the case before the announcement. The reason for introducing a relativized instead of an ordinary common knowledge operator is well-known: because of its higher expressivity, relativized common knowledge allows for the formulation of a reduction axiom under public announcements (van Benthem et al. 2006 ).
Footnote 7 continued formula corresponding to condition (i) follows from the formula corresponding to the prudence principle by the formula p → ¬K i ¬ p, which is exactly the formula corresponding to the reflexivity of R i . 8 For any binary relation R ⊆ W × W , I abbreviate R[w] := {v ∈ W | (w, v) ∈ R}. Furthermore, I will write R * for the reflexive transitive closure of R, and R + for the transitive closure of R.
Knowledge and (relativized) common knowledge have 'post-experimental' counterparts: R i ϕ and X ϕ ψ. 9 First, R i ϕ says that after carrying out the experiments, agent i will know that ϕ was the case before the experiments. Second, X ϕ ψ says that after carrying out the experiments, if ϕ is announced, then it becomes common knowledge (among agents 1 and 2) that ψ was the case before the experiments and the announcement. These operators 'pre-encode' the effects of the experiments in the static language, and will thus enable us to express reduction axioms for the dynamic experimentation operator that will be introduced in the next subsection.
Ordinary (post-experimental) common knowledge can be defined as Cϕ := C ϕ and X ϕ := X ϕ. Furthermore (post-experimental) general knowledge is defined by putting Eϕ :
Formulas of the form a 1 P i (ϕ 1 ) + · · · + a n P i (ϕ n ) ≥ k are called i-probability formulas. Note that mixed agent indices are not allowed in such formulas; e.g. P 1 (ϕ)+ P 2 (ψ) ≥ k is not a well-formed formula. Intuitively, P i (ϕ) ≥ k says that agent i assigns probability at least k to ϕ. There are two reasons for allowing summation and multiplication by rationals: (i) this additional expressivity is useful when establishing completeness results, and (ii) it allows us to express some very 'useful' statements, for example, comparative statements and statements about conditional probabilities. A comparative statement such as 'agent i thinks that ϕ is at least twice as probable as ψ' is expressed as P i (ϕ) ≥ 2P i (ψ); 10 it allows us to compare agent i's attitudes towards ϕ and ψ without giving the concrete probabilities that she assigns to these propositions. Furthermore, recall that in probability theory, the conditional probability of ϕ given ψ is defined as P(ϕ|ψ) := P(ϕ∧ψ) P(ψ) (provided that P(ψ) > 0); it thus makes sense to introduce the following formal definition in the object language:
Since the various types of dynamics that will be introduced in the next two subsections all involve Bayesian conditionalization (and thus conditional probabilities), the formal definition above will often be very convenient.
Consider a probabilistic Kripke model M = W, R 1 , R 2 , E 1 , E 2 , μ 1 , μ 2 , V and a state w ∈ W . Now and in the remainder of this paper, I will often abbreviate
The formal semantics of L is inductively defined as follows:
Truth and validity at a model M, a frame F, and a class of frames C are defined as usual:
As promised earlier, I finish this subsection with frame correspondence results for conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 1. 
Proof In both statements, the left-to-right entailment follows immediately from the semantics; we therefore focus on the right-to-left entailments. Both of these entailments will be proved using contraposition. For the first item, suppose that there exists a state
For the second item, suppose that there exist states 
It is easy to check that if M is a probabilistic Kripke model, then M e is a probabilistic Kripke model as well; cf. Lemma 9 of Demey (2010) . This model represents the world and the agents' knowledge and probabilities after the agents have each carried out their experiment.
Recall that I abbreviated R e = (R 1 ∩ E 1 ) ∪ (R 2 ∩ E 2 ) in the previous subsection. Applying Definition 3, this can now be rewritten as R e = R e 1 ∪ R e 2 , which is structurally analogous to the other abbreviation: R = R 1 ∪ R 2 .
I will now justify the definition of the model update operation M → M e by explaining the intuitions behind it, and by showing that it leads to the right results in a concrete scenario. Carrying out the experiments does not change the set of possible states. Experiment 1 intersects agent 1's accessibility relation R 1 with the experiment relation E 1 , and leaves agent 2's accessibility relation unchanged (R e 1 = R 1 ∩ E 1 ). Hence, after carrying out her experiment, agent 1 cannot distinguish between states w and v iff (i) before the experiment, she could not distinguish between those states, and (ii) her experiment does not differentiate between them. Dually: after carrying out her experiment, agent 1 knows that ϕ iff (i) she already knew that ϕ before the experiment (by perfect recall), or she has learned that ϕ is the case by performing her experiment. Symmetric remarks hold for experiment 2. 11 This closely resembles the description by Bonanno and Nehring (1997) of the experiments as imposing a partition on the model. 12 Let's now turn to the probabilistic component. The definition of μ e i (w) can be rewritten in terms of conditional probabilities:
e. agent i conditionalizes on the information that she has gained by performing her experiment (viz. the information that the actual world w belongs to the cell E i [w] of the partition induced by her experiment). This captures the idea that the agents process new information by means of Bayesian updating. 13 Example 1 Consider the following scenario. Agent 1 doesn't know whether p is the case, i.e. she cannot distinguish between p-states and ¬ p-states. (At the actual state, 11 I already discussed the analogy between carrying out an experiment and asking a question. Modeling the experiments as intersecting R i with E i is analogous to the 'resolve' action in the dynamic epistemic logic of questions (van Benthem and Minicȃ, 2012, Definition 6): carrying out an experiment means getting an answer to a question posed to nature. 12 If one assumes that R i = W × W (recall Footnote 6), then R e i = E i , i.e. agent i's knowledge after the experiments consists entirely of what she has learned from carrying out her experiment. Furthermore, it then holds that
, where i (w) is the cell of the partition i that contains w (obviously, since i is generated by the equivalence relation E i , it holds that i (w) = E i [w]). 13 Note that μ e i is well-defined (no dangerous division by 0): since E i is an equivalence relation, it holds that w ∈ E i [w], so by condition (i) in Definition 1 it follows that
p is true.) Furthermore, agent 1 has no specific reason to think that one state is more probable than any other; therefore it is reasonable for her to assign equal probabilities to all states. Finally, although agent 1 does not know whether p is the case, she has an experiment that discriminates between p-states and ¬ p-states, and that thus, when carried out, will allow her to find out whether p is the case. (Agent 2 does not play a role in this scenario.)
Consider the model
, and V ( p) = {w} (the definitions of μ 1 (v), R 2 , E 2 and μ 2 are irrelevant). It is easy to see that this model is a faithful representation of the above scenario. Consider, for example:
Now suppose that the agents carry out their experiments, i.e. consider the updated model M e . Applying Definition 3, it is easy to see that
So after carrying out her experiment, agent 1 has come to know that p is in fact the case. She has also adjusted her probabilities: she now assigns probability 1 to p being true, and probability 0 to p being false. These are the results that we would expect intuitively. Therefore, Definition 3 seems to be a natural way of representing the experimentation dynamics: it makes the intuitively right 'predictions' about the agents' knowledge and probabilities.
3.3 Dynamics: the communication phase I will now show how to model the second type of dynamics described in Sect. 2, viz. the communication phase. Intuitively, the communication protocol will be treated as a dialogue about ϕ, i.e. a sequence in which the agents each repeatedly communicate the subjective probability they assign to ϕ (at that point in the dialogue). Single steps in the dialogue are modeled as public announcements.
Public announcements

I first introduce single public announcements. Syntactically, we add a new dynamic operator [!·] to the language L([EXP]), thus obtaining the language L([EXP],[!·]).
The public announcement operator [!ϕ] says that the formula ϕ is truthfully and publicly announced to all agents. Hence, [!ϕ]ψ is to be read as: 'after the truthful public announcement of ϕ, it will be the case that ψ'. The truthfulness of the announcement is captured by means of a precondition in the semantic clause; this clause involves going from the model M to the updated model M ϕ , which is defined immediately afterwards:
It is easy to check that if M is a probabilistic Kripke model, then M ϕ is a probabilistic Kripke model as well; cf. Lemma 16 of Demey (2010) . This model represents the world and the agents' knowledge and probabilities after the public announcement of ϕ.
I will now justify the definition of the model update operation M → M ϕ by showing that it nicely captures the intuitive idea of the public announcement of a formula ϕ. As usual, the main effect of the public announcement of ϕ is that all ¬ϕ-states get deleted. The other components, R i , E i and V, change accordingly. Let's now turn to the probabilistic component. The definition of μ ϕ i (w) can be rewritten in terms of conditional probabilities:
e. agent i conditionalizes on (the information conveyed by) the formula that was publicly announced. 14 This idea can also be expressed in the object language, by means of the following formula (Kooi, 2003, p. 394) :
It is easy to check that this formula is true on all probabilistic Kripke models. The antecedent mentions the truthfulness precondition of public announcements. The consequent says that public announcement is related to Bayesian conditionalization (modulo dynamic effects): agent i's probability for ψ after the public announcement of ϕ is the same as her probability before the announcement for [!ϕ]ψ, conditional on ϕ.
Definition 4 fits well with our intuitive idea of what a public announcement of ϕ is, and how it influences the agents' knowledge and probabilities. One can easily construct scenarios similar to Example 1, in which the 'predictions' about the agents' knowledge and probabilities made by Definition 4 match perfectly with our intuitive expectations.
Dialogues
I will now move from single public announcements to sequences of public announcements. I will focus on one particular type of such sequences, which will be called a dialogue about ϕ. In a dialogue about ϕ, each agent repeatedly announces the probability she assigns to ϕ (at that step in the dialogue). I will show that such dialogues reach a fixed point after finitely many steps. 14 Note that μ ϕ i is well-defined (no dangerous division by 0):
Note that for any model M, state w of M, and formula ϕ, it holds-by definition of
A single step in the dialogue consists of both agents publicly announcing the probabilities they assign to ϕ (at that point in the dialogue). In other words, a single step consists of the public announcement of the sentence P 1 (ϕ) = a ∧ P 2 (ϕ) = b, for the unique a, b ∈ R that make this sentence true.
For any probabilistic Kripke model M that contains w, we define f w,ϕ (M) to be the result of publicly announcing the sentence d (M, w, ϕ) ,w,ϕ) , and thus f w,ϕ can be applied to this model as well. In general, f n w,ϕ (M) is a well-defined probabilistic Kripke model for all n ≥ 0. Unraveling the definitions, we see that
The entire dialogue about ϕ will now be modeled as a sequence in which the agents repeatedly announce the probabilities they assign to ϕ. Consider a probabilistic Kripke model M that contains the state w. By repeatedly applying f w,ϕ to M we obtain a sequence which looks as follows:
The following lemma says that the models in this sequence do not continue to change ad infinitum, i.e. the dialogue reaches a fixed point after finitely many steps. 16
Lemma 3 Consider a probabilistic Kripke model M that contains the state w. Then there exists an n
15 Note that I have tacitly moved outside the official object language here, because the formula P 1 (ϕ) = a ∧ P 2 (ϕ) = b involves real numbers which might not be rational (a, b ∈ R − Q), whereas the official object language only contains rational numbers. Technically speaking, this can be 'repaired' (cf. Demey 2010), and it does not matter from a modeling perspective, so I will not dwell on it further. 16 Recall that probabilistic Kripke models are assumed to be finite in this paper; cf. Definitions 1 and 2. If infinite models are allowed as well, then Lemma 3 no longer holds. However, because the submodels of M (ordered by the submodel relation) form a chain-complete poset and f w,ϕ is a deflationary map on this poset, the Bourbaki-Witt theorem (1949) still guarantees that f w,ϕ has a fixed point; however, it might take transfinitely many steps to reach this fixed point. From an application-oriented perspective, such transfinite dialogues make little sense, and I will therefore not pursue this topic any further.
Proof For any probabilistic Kripke model K, let |K| denote the number of states in K. For a reductio, suppose that for all n ∈ N :
This contradicts the fact that M has, by definition, only finitely many states.
I will now provide an exact definition of the communication dynamics. Syntactically, we add the [DIAL(
) (this is the final, and most expressive, language considered in this paper). The [DIAL(ϕ)]-operator says that both agents carry out a dialogue about ϕ, i.e. they repeatedly announce the probabilities they assign to ϕ, until a fixed point is reached (Lemma 3 guarantees that such a fixed point will indeed always be reached after finitely many steps). Hence, [DIAL(ϕ)]ψ is to be read as: 'after the agents have carried out a dialogue about ϕ, it will be the case that ψ'.
The semantic clause for [DIAL(ϕ)] involves going to the fixed point model M dial w (ϕ) , which is defined immediately afterwards:
V be an arbitrary probabilistic Kripke model, w ∈ W an arbitrary state, and ϕ an arbitrary formula. Then we define
where n is the least number such that f n w,ϕ (M) = f n+1 w,ϕ (M) (this number is guaranteed to exist by Lemma 3).
Observation 1 Recall that public announcements are assumed to be truthful. Furthermore, a dialogue about ϕ is modeled as a sequence of public announcements. However, the semantics of [DIAL(ϕ)] does not involve any preconditions. The reason for this is that the formulas being announced throughout the dialogue sequence are true by definition, cf. (2). Because a dialogue about ϕ always takes on this form (it will never involve the announcement of other formulas than d (K, w, ϕ) , for probabilistic Kripke models K that contain the state w), the truth precondition can be safely left out.
Observation 2 Given the move from single public announcements to sequences of public announcements that was just described, one might wonder why we considered only single experiments (and no sequences of experiments) in Subsect. 3.2. However, since experiments typically concern factual propositions (Boolean combinations of propositional atoms), the single update M → M e can be interpreted as 'summarizing' an entire sequence of experiments. Consider, for example, the sequence consisting of a binary experiment 'is p the case?' followed by another binary experiment 'is q the case?'; by performing this sequence of experiments, the agent will first find out whether p is the case, and then whether q is the case. Because the first experiment does not change the truth value of p, this sequence of experiments can be replaced by one single, complex experiment that allows the agent to discover the truth values of p and q simultaneously. Formally, this is achieved by putting 17 In principle, one can also compress a sequence of public announcements into a single pubic announcement. However, such a compression will be much more intricate, because the public announcement of a formula will typically change the truth value of that formula, and thus influence the set of formulas that can be announced next. (Recall the definitions of d(M, w, ϕ) and f w,ϕ .) 
Agreement theorems in PDEL
Using the semantic setup introduced in the previous section, I will now formulate and prove various dynamic agreement theorems in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. In Subsect. 4.1 I discuss agreement theorems that make the experimentation dynamics explicit, but still leave the communication implicit. In Subsect. 4.2 I build on this and formulate agreement theorems that make both the experimentation and the communication dynamics explicit.
Agreement theorems in PDEL: only experimentation
Before turning to the first agreement theorem in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, I formulate two easy auxiliary lemmas: (Y ) ; this proves the first part. For the second part, note that
Since μ i (w)(Y ) > 0, it follows that
This brings us to the first agreement theorem: 
Then we have:
, so condition 2 of this theorem applies to v , i.e. μ 1 (w) = μ 1 (v ) ( ‡). We now have: 
It is easy to see that the entire argument presented above can also be carried out for agent 2. The conclusion of this second, analogous argument will be that
Now recall condition 1 of this theorem: μ 1 (w) = μ 2 (w). Hence (3) and (4) together imply that a = b.
Observation 3 The reader familiar with Aumann (1976) will probably have noticed that the proof of the first agreement theorem in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic is a straightforward adaptation of Aumann's own proof for his original agreement theorem (but incorporating already the experimentation dynamics, whereas Aumann's theorem is fully static; cf. Subsect. 6.1). This shows that probabilistic Kripke models are a natural setting in which to formalize (dynamic) agreement theorems.
I will now comment on the intuitive interpretation of this theorem and on the two assumptions required to prove it. The theorem is essentially a sentence of the formal language L([EXP]), and says that if after carrying out the experiments, the agents reach common knowledge about their posteriors for ϕ, then these posteriors have to be identical. Intuitively, this is very close to Aumann's original agreement theorem, but with the experimentation dynamics explicitly represented in the language. Note, however, that this theorem talks about what will be the case if the agents reach common knowledge for their posterior about ϕ, without saying anything about how such common knowledge is to be achieved.
The two conditions required to prove the agreement theorem are fairly weak. Condition 1 (μ 1 (w) = μ 2 (w)) is an immediate formalization of Aumann's 'common prior' assumption, but localized to the concrete state w. Condition 2 (μ i (w) = μ i (v) for all v ∈ R * [w]) is a weakened version of an assumption that is also implicit in Aumann's original setup: Aumann works with structures which have just one probability mass function, i.e. he assumes that μ i (x) = μ i (y) for all states x, y ∈ W . Theorem 1 shows that this assumption can be weakened: the local version (μ i (x) = μ i (w) for all x ∈ R * [w]) suffices. In Subsect. 5.2 I will show that under the common prior assumption, common knowledge is not needed to characterize this property: individual knowledge suffices.
It should be noted that Theorem 1 is a local theorem (about a particular state w) and a theorem about probabilistic Kripke models. However, in the proof we nowhere made any use of the concrete valuation. Furthermore, also the reference to the concrete state w can be eliminated by 'de-localizing' the theorem's two assumptions. In this way, we arrive at the following global frame version of the first agreement theorem: 
Then we have:
Proof Let V : Prop → ℘ (W ) be an arbitrary valuation on F, and let w ∈ W be an arbitrary state. Since the conditions of this theorem are simply the 'de-localized' versions of the conditions of Theorem 1, it follows immediately by that theorem that
Agreement theorems in PDEL: experimentation and communication
I now turn to the second agreement theorem in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, which also explicitly represents the communication dynamics (in contrast with the first agreement theorem).
First, however, one more auxiliary lemma is needed. Intuitively, this lemma says that after a dialogue about ϕ, the agents' probabilities for ϕ become common knowledge.
Lemma 6 Let
M = W, R 1 , R 2 , E 1 , E 2 , μ 1 , μ 2 , V
be an arbitrary probabilistic Kripke model and assume that
Let n be the least number such that f n w,ϕ (M) = f n+1 w,ϕ (M) (such a number is guaranteed to exist by Lemma 3). Note that (ϕ) . From this it follows trivially that M dial w (ϕ) , w | Cδ, as required. This brings us to the second agreement theorem in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, which explicitly represents both the experimentation and the communication dynamics: 
Then we have:
Proof This proof is structurally completely analogous to that of Theorem 1. Making use of Lemma 6, we show that
and that
where R * is the reflexive transitive closure of R = R 1 ∪ R 2 , and R i is agent i's epistemic indistinguishability relation in the model (M e ) dial w (ϕ) . Statements (5) and (6), together with condition 1 of this theorem, entail that a = b. For more details, see Theorem 38 of Demey (2010) .
The theorem says that after the agents have carried out the experiments, and then carried out a dialogue about ϕ, their posteriors for ϕ have to be identical. Intuitively, this is very close to Aumann's original agreement theorem, except that the experimentation and communication dynamics are now explicitly represented in the language.
We again obtain a global frame version of the agreement theorem by 'de-localizing' the assumptions: 
Proof Let V : Prop → ℘ (W ) be an arbitrary valuation on F, and let w ∈ W be an arbitrary state. Since the conditions of this theorem are simply the 'de-localized' versions of the conditions of Theorem 3, it follows by that theorem that
Observation 4 The first agreement theorem (Theorems 1 and 2) states that if the agents have common knowledge of their posteriors, then these posteriors have to be identical. However, it says nothing about how this common knowledge is to be achieved, i.e. it did not say anything about the communication. The second agreement theorem (Theorems 3 and 4), however, does explicitly represent the communication dynamics, and thus no longer needs the assumption of common knowledge: the existence of common knowledge can now be derived from the communication protocol (cf. Lemma 6).
Metatheory
I will now develop a sound and complete logic in which the agreement theorem can be derived. Subsection 5.1 discusses a technical difficulty related to the syntactic perspective on probabilistic epistemic logic in general, and proposes a solution to it. Subsection 5.2 provides characterization results for the conditions of the agreement theorems proved in Sect. 4. These characterization results are then used in Subsect. 5.3 to obtain various axiomatizations.
A difficulty about expressivity
The modelling of the experiments has so far been very general: agent i's experiment corresponds to any equivalence relation E i (or, equivalently, to any partition of the model) whatsoever. From the syntactic perspective, however, this full generality is difficult to maintain, because it exceeds the expressive powers of the formal language L( [EXP] ). I will first give a concrete illustration of this problem and then propose a solution to it.
Recall the semantics for i-probability formulas such as P i (ϕ) ≥ k:
There is a clear asymmetry in expressivity between both sides of this definition. On the left hand side, there is a formula of the formal language L( [EXP] ). The BackusNaur form of this language guarantees that P i (·) will always receive a formula as its argument. On the right hand side, however, we have the function μ i (w)(·), which can receive any set X ⊆ W whatsoever as its argument, even undefinable sets (i.e. sets
. It may well be the case that
is an undefinable set. In that case, several problems of expressivity will arise; for example, the [EXP]-reduction axiom for i-probability formulas will in general not be expressible in L( [EXP] ). 18 To solve the problem, it should thus be ensured that E i [w] is always definable by means of some formula. One way to ensure this is by restricting to binary experiments. 19 The first, syntactic step of this strategy is to introduce two new primitive formulas α 1 , α 2 into the language. The second, semantic step involves assuming that for any probabilistic Kripke frame
. The third and final step links syntax and semantics, by extending the valuations to the newly introduced α i 's: for any valuation V on F, we require that V (α i ) ∈ {E F i , W − E F i }, and thus obtain:
It is easy to check that E i , thus defined, is still an equivalence relation, and furthermore, that this new definition is 'compatible' with the main types of dynamics discussed in this paper, in the sense that if a probabilistic Kripke model M satisfies condition (7), then the updated models M e and M ϕ will satisfy it as well. Informally, (7) says that agent i's experiment only differentiates between α i -states and ¬α i -states; in other words, it is a 'binary experiment'. Continuing the analogy between experiments and questions, carrying out a binary experiment corresponds to asking a yes-no question: 'is α i the case?'.
In this more restricted setup, it follows easily from condition (7) that
is now always definable: either by α i or by ¬α i (depending on whether M, w | α i ). This definability result will be used extensively in Subsect. 5.3 (in the [EXP]-reduction axiom for iprobability formulas, but also in other axioms).
Characterization results
In Sect. 4, I established various dynamic agreement theorems. These theorems required imposing two conditions on probabilistic Kripke models/frames. I will now establish characterization results for (the global frame versions of) these conditions. 18 Here's another way of putting the problem. Both experimentation and public announcement of a formula ϕ change the probabilistic component of a Kripke model via Bayesian conditionalization:
In the case of public announcement, this fact can also be expressed in the object language by means of the following formula (which was already mentioned before):
In the case of experimentation, however, the fact that the agents' probabilities get updated by means of Bayesian conditionalization cannot be expressed in the object language (because the set E i [w] might be undefinable). 19 From a technical perspective, this solution is analogous to the construction of general frames in modal logic (Blackburn et al. 2001 ). An entirely different solution, based on hybrid logic, is explored in detail in Demey (2010) . There it is also argued that the 'binary experiments'-solution is preferable on technical as well as methodological grounds.
I first characterize the common prior assumption, i.e. condition 1 of Theorems 2 and 4. If ϕ is a 1-probability formula, I will use ϕ[P 2 /P 1 ] to denote the formula that is obtained by uniformly substituting P 2 for P 1 in ϕ. It is clear that if ϕ is a 1-probability formula, then ϕ[P 2 /P 1 ] is a 2-probability formula. Finally, an i-probability formula ϕ is said to be atomic iff it is of the form n =1 a P i ( p ) ≥ k, i.e. iff the arguments of its probability operators are propositional atoms (rather than arbitrary formulas).
Lemma 7 Let F = W, R 1 , R 2 , E 1 , E 2 , μ 1 , μ 2 be an arbitrary probabilistic Kripke frame. Then we have:
Proof The left-to-right entailment follows immediately from the semantics; the rightto-left entailment will be proved by contraposition. Suppose that μ 1 = μ 2 . Hence there exist states w, v ∈ W such that μ 1 (w)(v) = μ 2 (w) (v) . Without loss of generality,
Observation 5 Lemma 7 clearly involves a (countably) infinite set of formulas (the same holds for the second characterization result, stated in Lemmas 8 and 9). Halpern (2002) provides another characterization of the common prior assumption, which also involves a (countably) infinite set of formulas (viz. all instances of a single scheme). Halpern's characterization involves formulas which are strongly related to the agreeing to disagree theorem, and is thus not suitable for our current purposes: in the next subsection, the characterization results established here will be used to provide a complete axiomatization of a logic in which the agreeing to disagree result is formally derivable; if the logic's axiomatization would itself already include (something very close to) the agreement theorem, then this derivation would be trivial. Additionally, the formulas used in Lemma 7 seem to be the most straightforward way of formally expressing the common prior assumption: agents 1 and 2 having a common prior means exactly that
Condition 2 of Theorems 2 and 4 can be characterized as follows: 
Proof The left-to-right entailment follows immediately from the semantics; the rightto-left entailment will be proved by contraposition. Suppose that there exist states w, v ∈ W such that (w, v) ∈ R * and yet μ i (w) = μ i (v) . Hence there exists a state (x) , one of the following two cases obtains:
Observation 6 The condition that μ i (w) = μ i (v) whenever (w, v) ∈ R * is a very heavy constraint to impose on probabilistic Kripke frames: it involves the reflexive transitive closure of R, and might therefore be called 'semi-global'. This aspect is reflected in the above characterization result, which makes use of the common knowledge operator C. However, because frame validity is itself a global notion, it is possible to capture the semi-global frame property involving R * by means of the more modest general knowledge operator E. This result is still not fully satisfactory, however: the principles that ϕ → Eϕ and ¬ϕ → E¬ϕ (for atomic i-probability formulas ϕ) still require the 'public availability' of agent i's subjective probabilistic setup. However, in frames satisfying the common prior assumption (μ 1 = μ 2 )-and note that all frames used to prove the agreement results indeed satisfy this propery!-more plausible 'individual' introspection principles suffice: ϕ → K i ϕ and ¬ϕ → K i ¬ϕ (for atomic i-probability formulas ϕ). Hence, no notion of social (common/general) knowledge is required to characterize the second assumption of the agreement theorems.
Lemma 9 Let F = W, R 1 , R 2 , E 1 , E 2 , μ 1 , μ 2 be an arbitrary probabilistic Kripke frame and suppose that μ 1 = μ 2 . Then we have:
and for all atomic i-probability formulas ϕ :
Proof Again, the left-to-right entailment follows immediately from the semantics; the right-to-left entailment will be proved directly this time (i.e. not by contraposition). Assume that F | (ϕ → Eϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ → E¬ϕ) for all atomic i-probability formulas ϕ, and call this assumption ( †). We now prove for all states
. This is proved by induction on n. The base case is trivial. For the induction case, consider arbitrary states w, v ∈ W and assume that (w, v) ∈ R n+1 . Hence there is a state u ∈ W such that (w, u) ∈ R n and (u, v) ∈ R. Since (w, u) ∈ R n it follows by the induction hypothesis that μ i (w) = μ i (u); I claim that μ i (u) = μ i (v) as well, and hence it follows that μ i (w) = μ i (v) . (x) , one of the following two cases obtains:
Proof of the claim that
, which again contradicts assumption ( †).
The logics
I will now define three logics of increasing strength, and prove them to be sound and complete with respect to natural classes of Kripke frames. The second and, especially, the third logic capture the reasoning behind the agreement theorem. For the sake of clarity, these logics are presented in a modular fashion. The first logic is the basic probabilistic epistemic logic PEL, which captures the behavior of the epistemic and probabilistic operators. It does not say anything about agreement theorems. I first give a schematic overview of the logic, and then discuss each of its components separately.
Componentwise axiomatization of PEL The probabilistic component consists of two parts. The first part straightforwardly formalizes the well-known Kolmogorov axioms of probability; this is also adapted from Fagin and Halpern (1994) :
The second part of the probabilistic component consists of the two formulas that characterize properties (i) and (ii) of probabilistic Kripke frames (cf. Definition 1 and Lemma 2):
The intuitive motivation of these principles was already discussed in Sect. 3. Next, the pre-/post-experimental interaction component describes the influence of the experiments on the agents' (common) knowledge: it says that carrying out the experiments does not make the agents forget anything that they already (commonly) knew before the experiments (principles such as these are sometimes called perfect recall). Formally:
The final component of PEL involves the special proposition letters α i . First of all, there is an axiom which says that the post-experimental knowledge operator R i can be defined in terms of the usual knowledge operator K i and these special proposition letters: 20
Finally, this component also contains axioms which say that the agents' experiments are successful: if α i is the case, then after carrying out her experiment, agent i will know this; likewise if α i is not the case. Formally:
This concludes the presentation of the basic probabilistic epistemic logic PEL. I now introduce the second logic, viz. probabilistic epistemic agreement logic or PEAL. This logic is a simple extension of PEL: we just add an 'agreement component', which consists of the formulas that characterize the two frame properties needed in the agreement theorems (cf. Lemmas 7-9). The reduction axioms for [EXP] The reduction axioms for [EXP] are displayed below. Most of them are straightforward; I only emphasize the use of R i to pre-encode the effects of the experimentation dynamics on K i (similar remarks apply to common knowledge), and the use of α i in the reduction axiom for i-probability formulas to avoid non-expressibility (recall Sect. 5.1).
With the logics in place, I now turn towards their soundness and completeness. First, consider the classes of frames with respect to which soundness and completeness results will be proved: Definition 6 We write PKB for the class of all enriched probabilistic Kripke frames with binary experiments (i.e. satisfying condition (7)).
Definition 7 Consider an arbitrary frame
Then F is said to be an agreement frame iff it satisfies conditions 1 and 2 from Theorems 2 and 4. We write AGR for the class of all agreement frames.
In the approach developed in this paper, we have two 'temporally uniform' models: the model M = W, R 1 , R 2 , E 1 , E 2 , μ 1 , μ 2 , V representing the agents' knowledge and probabilities before the experiments have been carried out, and the model M e = W e , R e 1 , R e 2 , E e 1 , E e 2 , μ e 1 , μ e 2 , V e representing the agents' knowledge and probabilities after the experiments have been carried out. Now contrast this with Aumann's original models. These seem to be 'temporally incoherent': they represent the agents' knowledge after the experiments, but their probability distributions before the experiments. In the present framework, such a model would look as follows: W, R e 1 , R e 2 , E 1 , E 2 , μ 1 , μ 2 , V ; it is obtained by cutting the (temporally uniform) models M and M e into pieces, and then pasting these pieces back together in a 'temporally incoherent' way.
The situation can be analyzed as follows. The intuitive agreeing to disagree scenario described in Sect. 2 is intrinsically dynamic. If one formulates the agreement theorem in a static way (like Aumann did), then one will need to 'smuggle' this dynamics into the semantics somehow, thus obtaining 'temporally incoherent' models.
The approach developed in this paper, however, makes the underlying dynamics fully explicit. On the semantic side, we have a probabilistic Kripke model M which corresponds to the initial stage (before the experiments), a model M e which corresponds to the time immediately after the experiments, and finally, a model (M e ) dial w (ϕ) which corresponds to the final stage after the communication, at which the agents have reached common knowledge of their posteriors. Hence, there exists a complete structural analogy between the intuitive scenario on the one hand and its model-theoretical formalization on the other. On the syntactic side, the agreement theorems proved here (in particular, Theorems 3 and 4) are formulated using the dynamic [EXP]-and [DIAL(ϕ)]-operators, and are thus able to talk about this entire sequence of models M → M e → (M e ) dial w (ϕ) . Hence, they can be read as natural and explicit descriptions of the intuitive scenario that was behind the original agreement theorem.
To summarize: the agreement theorems developed in this paper perfectly illustrate the dynamic turn in logic (recall the quote from van Benthem given in Sect. 2). In the next subsection, I will show that this dynamic turn offers a new perspective on the conceptual landscape surrounding the agreement theorem, and, in particular, on the role of common knowledge.
The role of common knowledge
In order to formulate and prove his agreement theorem, Aumann used the notion of common knowledge, thus being the first author to introduce this notion in the gametheoretical literature. Therefore, it is widely assumed that common knowledge plays a central role in agreeing to disagree results. Several results established throughout this paper, however, seem to suggest that the importance of common knowledge is not so central as is often thought.
First of all, in Aumann's original setup, the (common) prior probability distribution is assumed to be common knowledge among the agents. This is reflected in the present framework by the characterization result involving ϕ → Cϕ (and ¬ϕ → C¬ϕ) for i-probability formulas ϕ. However, I showed that this can be replaced with the much weaker individual probabilistic-epistemic introspection principle ϕ → K i ϕ (for i-probability formulas ϕ) (cf. Observation 6). In other words, the assumption that the agents' prior probability distributions are common knowledge can be formally captured without making use of the common knowledge operator.
A second, more important observation concerns the role of common knowledge in obtaining consensus (i.e. identical posterior probabilities). Aumann's original theorem says that if after carrying out the experiments, the agents have common knowledge of their posteriors, then these posteriors have to be identical. However, this theorem does not say how the agents are to obtain this common knowledge (it just assumes that they have been able to obtain it one way or another). The way to obtain common knowledge is via a certain communication protocol. Once this communication dynamics is made explicitly part of the story (as suggested by the dynamic turn-recall the previous subsection), common knowledge of the posteriors need no longer be assumed in the formulation of the agreement theorem (cf. Observation 4), since it will now simply follow from the communication protocol (cf. Lemma 6).
Finally, note that these comments on the relative unimportance of common knowledge for agreeing to disagree results are in line with the results by Parikh and Krasucki (1990) . They consider groups of more than two agents, in which communication does not occur publicly, but in pairs. They show that, given certain conditions on the communication protocol, the agents will reach consensus (identical posteriors), but not common knowledge.
Conclusion
In this paper I have established various agreement theorems in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. In particular, I established model-and frame-based versions of an agreement theorem with experimentation (Theorems 1 and 2), and of an agreement theorem with experimentation and communication (Theorems 3 and 4). I developed a sound and complete logical system within which the first agreement result is derivable (Theorem 5 and Observation 8). Throughout the paper, I have emphasized that the models and logics are intuitively plausible, and directly connected with Aumann's original agreement result.
I have also discussed how these technical results can be seen as an application of the dynamic turn in logic. After showing that Aumann's original result fails to fully capture the essential dynamics behind the agreement theorem (both in its formulation and in its semantic setup), I argued that the agreement theorems established in this paper do succeed in fully capturing this dynamics. In the first place, this means that these agreement theorems can be read as natural and explicit descriptions of the intuitive scenario that was behind Aumann's original result. Moreover, I showed that this perspective has important conceptual consequences, for example, for the role of common knowledge in agreement theorems. Common knowledge and communication seem to be two sides of the same coin: common knowledge is the result of communication, so if the communication dynamics is explicitly represented in the agreement theorem, there is no need anymore to assume common knowledge (as this will now follow from the communication protocol).
The technical and philosophical results presented in this paper naturally suggest topics for further research. One issue that might be particularly interesting concerns the scope of the logical framework presented in this paper. As I already mentioned earlier, game theorists have continued to work on extensions and refinements of Aumann's original agreement theorem. For example, Parikh and Krasucki (1990) have considered scenarios with different (non-public) communication protocols, and Monderer and Samet (1989) have shown that if common knowledge is replaced with common pbelief, then a weak version of the agreement theorem continues to hold (the agents' posteriors need no longer be identical, but their difference is bounded by a function of the parameter p). Furthermore, note that the current framework assumes that the experimentation and communication dynamics yield hard information: they lead to knowledge and full certainty (probability 1); one might wonder how the agreement theorem fares if one or both of these types of dynamics can yield soft information (i.e. lead to 'mere' beliefs and probabilities less than 1). It will be interesting to investigate whether such extensions and refinements can also be formalized in the framework of probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic.
